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Civil Law Pulsations
Along the Latin American Periphery
Ángel R. Oquendo*
The civil law system shows its true face as it travels from the
Continental European core to the Latin American periphery.
Many of the principal institutions have found a home and
thrived in the new and radically different environment. One
can best study them there by contemplating how they have
preserved some of their most basic features despite having
transformed themselves into something else.
The notion of the civil law tradition and that of codification
have themselves undergone this dialectic of transformation
and preservation. So have the traditional approach to contractual interpretation and to third-party agreements and
the common proscriptions on retroactivity and punitive damages. In Latin America, as well as in Continental Europe,
the intent of the parties typically takes precedence over the
text of the contract and an agreement normally may benefit
a third party despite the general restriction on extra-party
effects. Similarly, a relatively strict ban on the retroactive
application of statutes and on the imposition of punitive
damages prevails on both sides of the Atlantic.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The civil law system shows its true face in Latin America. Certainly, it sees its blurry contours grow in blurriness as it travels from
the Continental European core to the Latin American periphery.
Nevertheless, many of the principal institutions have found a home
and thrived in the new and radically different environment. In fact,
one can best study them, in their modern globalized form, there, by
contemplating how they have preserved their most basic features despite having transformed themselves into something else.
To a great extent, this legal development mirrors its linguistic
counterpart. The Spanish and Portuguese languages underwent a
similarly dramatic transformation upon crossing the Atlantic Ocean.
As currently internationalized, they exist most clearly and call for
examination as they have developed in the New World.
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Parts II and III will, respectively, explore the notion of the civil
law tradition and that of codification in Continental Europe and, particularly, in Latin America. Part IV will, in turn, analyze the widely
shared approach to contractual interpretation generally and to thirdparty agreements specifically. Finally, Part V will shift from prescriptions to proscriptions, in particular to those on retroactivity and
punitive damages. Predictably, Part VI will close with a couple concluding thoughts.
II.
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
The civil law tradition developed in Continental Europe and
took root all over the world, principally as a result of European colonialism. Iberian American countries partake in this heritage because they once belonged to the Spanish and Portuguese empires.
The law of Spain and Portugal emerged on the Iberian Peninsula,
expanded into Latin America, and mostly displaced indigenous legal
cultures.1
The term “civil law tradition” underscores the centrality of civil
law. Civil law, as a subcategory of private law, generally regulates
relationships between individuals or private entities. It differs fundamentally from public law, which governs disputes involving the
government. However, civil law does not exhaust the category of
private law because it refers only to those private matters that concern the civil code. It therefore includes areas such as torts, contracts, property, family, and successions, but ordinarily excludes
commercial, corporate, traffic, labor, and insurance matters.2 The
civil code, accordingly, defines the boundaries of civil law.3
In Latin America, as well as in Continental Europe, civil law
reigns supreme. It commands respect, sometimes reverence. Specifically, it serves as a model for other areas, like constitutional, administrative, and criminal law. Furthermore, it represents a common
language for all lawyers, regardless of their specialization. In fact, it

1

See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL W. GORDON, CHRISTOPHER
OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL (1982); JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1985).
2
See GLENDON et al., supra note 1, at 45; MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 6-7.
3
See generally Part III infra.
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occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of constitutional law
in the United States.4
The civil law tradition should not be approached rigidly. It is by
no means fixed or uniform, let alone sacred. It encompasses a variety of constantly evolving legal regimes, which frequently differ in
their basic structure, as well as in their details. These systems of law
simply share what Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein calls,
more broadly, a “family resemblance.”5 In other words, they do not
have a common essence, but, rather, interrelate with each other in a
complex manner. They present “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crosscutting at all levels: general and specific.”6
For instance, a particular jurisdiction may resemble others in that
it officially denies precedential force to decisions stemming from
the judiciary, yet it may diverge from them to the extent that it provides specialized courts for constitutional and administrative matters. Further, it may share this latter trait with another group, some
of whose members may recognize judicial precedents. In fact, a few
legal orders within the tradition do not even codify their civil law
and many of the rest conceive of their respective codes so differently
that one can hardly speak of a clear convergence.7
Nonetheless, the various systems of law resemble each other like
family members, who share certain features in a similar way. The
entire civil law tradition has a characteristic style or flavor, which
reflects the mentioned interconnections. This commonality, which
becomes more evident through a comparison with Anglo-American

4

See GLENDON et al., supra note 1, at 46; MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 6.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN § 67 (1967)
(“Familienähnlichkeiten.”) Wittgenstein explains that the members of a family do
not all share a particular characteristic or group of characteristics. Some resemble
others in the smile, others in the personality, and still others in the tone of voice.
They are thus all interrelated without converging on a single feature, “for the various resemblances between the members of a family: build, facial features, eye
color, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and intercross . . . .” Id. (“denn so
übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den
Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang,
Temperament, etc., etc.”).
6
Id. § 66 (“ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander
übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen.”).
7
See MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 26.
5
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law, derives from an intense process of cross-fertilization, as well as
from a shared history.8
An understanding of how the tradition as a whole hangs together, along with a requisite antecedent examination of the historical origins and subsequent development, is an invaluable asset in the
process of making sense of the underlying regimes. Taking this
overarching perspective is especially useful for people trained under
a different legal culture, such as the common law. It enables them to
perceive a particular civil law jurisdiction’s institutions not as a random assortment, but, rather, as a relatively coherent set. Through
this approach, Anglo-American lawyers may discern in Brazil’s
codification, managerial adjudication, and abstract judicial review
the country’s civil law heritage, instead of a quaint praxis.
One must proceed with caution when making generalizations,
precisely because of the noted variability within the civil law. An
even higher degree of circumspection is in order when considering
Latin American legal systems. The center of gravity of the civil law
tradition lies in Europe, particularly in Germany and France.9 Latin
American law has evolved on the periphery, under very particular
conditions of economic underdevelopment, fierce social conflict,
and heavy U.S. influence. Consequently, it often operates at a distance from the European paradigm.
Moreover, Latin America encompasses 20 distinct jurisdictions,
which operate independently of each other, even though they share
a transnational legal legacy.10 The main challenge in grasping the

8

See generally Part III infra.
See GLENDON et al., supra note 1, at 29 (The French Civil Code of 1804
and the German Civil Code of 1896 “have had such widespread and lasting influence that they and their accompanying ideologies can be said to have become part
of the contemporary civil law tradition.”).
10
See Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, Notas para una historia social del derecho en
América Latina: La relación de las prácticas y los principios jurídicos, 52 REV.
COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS P.R. 1 (1991) (“La primera y más banal observación es
que no existe un sistema jurídico latinoamericano sino veinte estados-naciones,
cada uno con su propio sistema . . . .En sentido opuesto puede hacerse también la
observación corriente de la relativa unidad cultural de la zona.”) (“Obviously, no
single, monolithic Latin American legal order exists as such. Each one of the
twenty nation-states has its own system . . . .Nonetheless, the cultural unity of the
entire territory is self-evident.”).
9
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law of the region is to perceive the broad parallels without neglecting the particularities. Of course, the recognition of a unified tradition ineluctably colors the interpretation of each of the individual
legal orders.
At most, the civil law provides a context for the study of Latin
American law. References to that tradition may launch the discussion, but they certainly should not bring it to an end. They simply
prepare the way for a thorough analysis of the peculiarities of the
particular legal systems that coexist throughout the Continent.
III.
CODIFICATION
By and large, Latin American countries share a civil law with
each other and with their Continental European counterparts. The
various national civil codes reflect this commonality, as well as substantial differences. They converge on their origins and aims, but
diverge on their details.11
In Latin America, as well as in Continental Europe, codification
ensued almost as a logical consequence of legal nationalization. Insofar as the nation-state intended to assert national law, it tended to
do so systematically. In other words, it typically put forth a code that
served as the sole source of law. The nationalized polity thus decided directly and explicitly what legal norms to apply within its
jurisdiction. Of course, it could still hold on to those aspects of the
European common law that it wanted to enforce in its domain.12
As the codification process unfolded, Latin American countries
were on their way out of the colonial fold. By 1822, most of them
had achieved independence.13 Latin America therefore took the road
to codification on its own. In fact, it did so earlier and more decisively than the former colonial powers.14
11

See generally Part II supra.
See generally Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 241, 248 (1985); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH
S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 42-43 (1975).
13
See generally KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, at 44.
14
See generally Bernardino Bravo Lira, Codificación Civil en Ibero-américa
y en la Península Ibérica (1827-1917): Derecho Nacional y Europeización, en
FUENTES IDEOLÓGICAS Y NORMATIVAS DE LA CODIFICACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA
(Abelardo Levaggi coord., 1992).
12
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After independence, the official legal unity of Latin America
came to an end. The different territories broke off from the overarching imperial realm of law and became separate jurisdictions.
Nonetheless, the pre-existing substantive legal cohesion largely endured.15
The new national regimes preserved Spanish and Portuguese private law, respectively, until they completed the protracted process
of codification. They engaged in “intensive comparative study of
texts”16 in order to produce their national codes. Each of these societies paid attention broadly to all available European legislation, but
especially to Latin American law. It primarily turned to its neighbors’ efforts because of the geographical, cultural, linguistic, and
legal proximity.17
In fact, some countries adopted verbatim codes prepared elsewhere in the region. For instance, Colombia, Panama, El Salvador,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Honduras enacted the Chilean
Code of 1857, written mostly by the Venezuelan Andrés Bello.
Other nations drew heavily from it. This most influential codification effort constitutes a milestone within the entire civil law tradition
and has had enormous influence throughout Latin America.18
Civil Code drafters normally seek to achieve two goals. First,
they attempt to rationalize the law.19 Second, they seek to proclaim
the will of the people as represented by elected officials and rationally elaborated by the drafting committee.20 These two objectives
lead to certain expectations regarding adjudication. For instance,

15

See generally id.
John Merryman coined this expression in John H. Merryman, Comparative
Law Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 771, 773 (1998).
17
See generally Bravo Lira, supra note 14; KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12,
at 45-47.
18
See generally Bravo Lira, supra note 14.
19
See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 225, 234-238 (1998); KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, at 45.
20
See Stein, supra note 12, at 252 (“It was the jurists who . . . prepared the
ground for the codification movement of the eighteenth century. But that movement was, in part at least, inspired by the layman’s suspicion both of jurists and
of judges and by a popular desire to weaken the power of both groups.”).
16
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courts must regard and interpret the code as a coherent and integrated whole.21 More importantly, they must strictly adhere to this
democratically enacted law when deciding concrete cases.
To a considerable degree, Latin American codes embrace the
French model on the relationship between legislation and adjudication.22 Many of them incorporate an equivalent not only of French
Article 4, which holds the judge liable for refusing to adjudicate because of the law’s silence, obscurity or insufficiency,23 but also of
Article 5, which prohibits generally binding judicial holdings.24
Chile’s Code, like others throughout Latin America, insists on the
preeminence of statutes’ clear import over any possible construal of
their underlying purpose: “When a law’s meaning is clear, its literal
import shall not be disregarded under the pretext of consulting its
spirit.”25
While the process of codification begins with similar premises
everywhere, the specific form it takes ineluctably varies from one
country to the next. Moreover, the historical school, which German
scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny most prominently defended,
contributed a novel notion. It proposed that the law should reflect

21

See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), Art. 2 (“La ley debe ser interpretada teniendo en cuenta sus palabras, sus finalidades, las leyes análogas, las disposiciones que surgen de los tratados sobre derechos humanos, los principios y los valores jurídicos, de modo coherente con todo el ordenamiento.”) (“The law shall be
interpreted taking into account its words, its aims, analogous laws, the provisions
of human rights treaties, and legal principles and values, in coherence with the
order as a whole.”).
22
See generally KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, at 45-47; Matthew C. Mirrow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andrés Bello’s Use of the Code
Napoléon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291, 308 (2001).
23
Compare CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 4 with CD. CIV. (Arg.) (1871), art. 15;
CD. CIV. (D.R.) (1884), art. 4; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18; CD. CIV. FED.
(Mex.) (1928), art. 18; CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 8; CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art.
7; CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 6; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), art. 15.
24
Compare CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 5 with CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 3;
CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1873), arts. 17 & 25; CD. CIV. (D.R.) (1826), art. 5; CD. CIV.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 3; CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 4; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868),
art. 12.
25
CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 19. See also CD. CIV. (COLOM.) (1873), art.
27; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18(1a); CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 17; CD.
CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 14; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), arts. 17; CD. CIV. (Venez.)
(1982), art. 4.
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the spirit of a particular people.26 In Latin America, this idea had
substantial influence, especially on Andrés Bello.27
In any event, Latin American codes began falling out of date
from their inception. They intensely continued down this path from
the twentieth century on. In response, legislatures have enacted
many specialized statutes in areas that have gained prominence
since codification, such as insurance, products liability, labor law,
corporations, etc. In the absence of legislative action, courts have
had to update the code when these matters have arisen in concrete
cases. Finally, legal scholars have heavily expounded the existing
provisions in an attempt to offer guidance for the judiciary, as well
as for lawmakers.28
For example, civil codes in Latin America, as in France and elsewhere, have required considerable updating in light of their antiquated, sexist view of the role of women in the family and in society.
Literally following the original French Article 213, Article 128 of
the Uruguayan Civil Code declares, for instance, that “the husband
shall protect the wife and the wife shall obey him.”29 The Uruguayan
legislature implicitly derogated this provision with the 1946
Women’s Civil Capacity Act.30
Similarly, Andrés Bello’s Civil Code for Chile embraces the initial French position by banning paternity suits. In 1998, the Chilean
Congress introduced Article 195, expressly allowing judicial inquiries into filiation.31 Nonetheless, Chile’s Supreme Court appears to
26
See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT
FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (2012). Savigny himself, how-

ever, opposed the process of codification in Germany. See Harold J. Berman &
Charles J. Reid, Jr., Roman Law in Europe and the Jus Commune: A Historical
Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of the Sixteenth Century , 20
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 28 (“Savigny, the great founder of the historical
school, opposed the codification of German civil law in the early nineteenth century, his opposition was based in part on the argument that in the German Länder
the time was not ripe for such a codification; in the later nineteenth century his
followers were among the leaders of the movement that produced the German
Civil Code.”).
27
See generally Mirrow, supra note 22, at 308.
28
See generally John H. Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and the
German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1868-1870 (1988).
29
Cd. Civ. (Uru.) (1868), art. 128.
30
L. 10783 (Uru.) (1946), art. 1.
31
L. 19585 (Chile) (1998), art. 195.
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have undermined the legislative intent of that provision by requiring
extensive documentary support for that kind of complaint.32 On a
more positive note, the same tribunal has discretely moved away
from the codified presumption that, upon separation, the mother
must “take personal charge of the children’s care.”33
Lawmakers, judges, and scholars have thus preserved the Code
from desuetude. As a result, however, they have increasingly led
people to look elsewhere for solutions to legal problems. In their
effort to maintain its relevance, these actors have, ultimately and
paradoxically, rendered the document ever more irrelevant.34
Throughout the region, legislative microsystems have cropped
up and judicial as well as administrative institutions have taken over
entire areas of law.35 In the twentieth and even twenty-first centuries, moreover, Latin American lawmakers have often distanced
themselves from their French or German counterparts by commissioning completely new, ideologically updated codes.36 Unfortunately, they have seldom provided guidance on how codification
might advance the social values and solidarity ideals of the welfare
state. Moreover, they have never made clear how a code could possibly regulate legal spheres that require permanent renewal and revision.
The previously described process of decodification has taken
place in a time in which the common law world has produced statutes for considerable portions of its private law. Consequently, the
contrast between the two western legal traditions no longer assumes
the form of a simple opposition between codified and judge-made
law. Both legal universes now overlap considerably on the pervasiveness of statutory law.37
32

See Báez Sierra v. Dinamarca Henríquez, Rol No. 461-01 (Supr. Ct.)
(Chile) (2002); Espinoza González v. Álvarez Díaz, Rol No. 2518-01 (Supr. Ct.)
(Chile) (2002).
33
CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 225. See In Re Carracedo Alvarado, Rol No.
1620-01 (Supr. Ct.) (Chile) (2001).
34
See generally Merryman, supra note 28, at 1868-1870.
35
See generally id.
36
See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016); CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005); CD. CIV.
(Braz.) (2003).
37
See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and
Case Law in the Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 667-670
(1998).
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The fact that court opinions have gained prominence has brought
the civil law realm closer to its common law counterpart. Of course,
even the highest court’s judicial decisions are not technically equivalent to case law. They may constitute a functional equivalent, however, inasmuch as they command attention and are broadly followed
throughout the jurisdiction.38
To a significant extent, this convergence tendency responds to
internal causes within each system. Intellectual as well as economic
globalization has also played a role in this development. It has led
the two legal communities to pay more attention to each other and
to borrow not only specific concepts but also general approaches
from each other.39
Civil, commercial, and procedural codes in Latin America have
borne the imprint of the civil law tradition from the nineteenth century onward. They have faced the same problems of obsolescence
and irrelevance as their continental European counterparts.40 Nonetheless, Latin American codes have run into special difficulties due
to the generalized institutional weakness and social injustice in the
region.41 They have therefore often failed to fulfill their mission or
deliver on their promise. These fundamental differences notwithstanding, a considerable degree of transatlantic coherence has survived.42
IV.

CONTRACTUAL INTENT AND THIRD-PARTY AGREEMENTS
PERUVIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

A.

Overview
This Part will analyze how, in Peru and other civil law jurisdictions, particularly within Latin America, the intent of the contracting
parties bears upon the interpretation of a contract, in relation to the
text. It will also consider whether third party agreements call for the
application of the same exegetical principles. The discussion will
conclude that they generally do and that they specifically escape the
38
39
40
41
42

See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally Merryman, supra note 28, at 1868-1870.
See generally Pérez Perdomo, supra note 10.
See, e.g., Parts IV & V infra.
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restriction on contractual extra-party effects, creating an enforceable
right for the beneficiary. In these areas, the civil law tradition shows
considerable cohesion and the code continues to play a central role.
B.

Intent of the Contractual Parties
At least since the nineteenth century, the civil law tradition has,
more openly than its common law counterpart, invited courts to focus on the intent of the parties over and above the ultimately executed contractual text. Of course, throughout the twentieth century,
it moved toward imposing social considerations to trump the intent
of the parties. For example, Continental European and Latin American jurisdictions started disallowing an oppressive labor contract,
even if the signatories had clearly agreed to it.43 Nonetheless, if no
such public interest restriction applies, what the parties intend carries the day, sometimes even over what they write in.
Latin American civil codes, true to their civil law roots, ordinarily mandate reading a contract through the parties’ joint intent. They
treat the underlying written instrument as both primary evidence of
and subservient to the latter. The Civil Code of Paraguay, providing
a stark case in point and essentially echoing its French counterpart,
declares: “When interpreting a contract, one should inquire into the
common intention of the parties rather than limit oneself to the literal sense of the words.”44 Bolivian law formulates this principle
similarly.45 The Brazilian legal system, inspired by the German
43

See, e.g., L. FED. TBJO. (Mexico) (1970), art. 5 (“ . . . no producirá efecto
legal, . . . , sea escrita o verbal, la estipulación que establezca . . . (II) Una jornada
mayor que la permitida por esta Ley; . . . (V) Un salario inferior al mínimo; . . . “)
(“ . . . agreements, whether written or oral, establishing the following shall have
no legal effect . . . : (II) a workday longer than this Act allows; . . . (V) a salary
lower than the minimum wage . . . .”).
44
CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 708 (“Al interpretarse el contrato se deberá
indagar cuál ha sido la intención común de parte y no limitarse al sentido literal
de las palabras.”). See also CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 1156 (“On doit dans les
conventions rechercher quelle a été la commune intention des parties contractantes, plutôt que de s’arrêter au sens littéral des termes.”) (“One should inquire
into the common intention of the parties to a contract rather than limit oneself to
the literal sense of the words.”).
45
See CD. CIV. (Bol.) (1976), art. 510 (“En la interpretación de los contratos
se debe averiguar cuál ha sido la intención común de las partes y no limitarse al
sentido literal de las palabras.”) (“When interpreting a contract, one should find
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model, deploys practically identical language when discussing “declarations of intent,” which constitute a key element in contractual
exegesis.46
Chile’s Civil Code, for its part, takes this overall approach most
typically: “If clearly known, the intention of the contracting parties
shall carry more weight than the contract’s literal words.”47 Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador each use the same phrasing,48 while
many other nations rely on an equivalent formulation: “If the terms
of a contract are clear and leave no doubt about the intention of its
parties, one should focus on the literal sense of its clauses. If the
words appear to run counter to the parties’ clear intention, the latter
shall take precedence over the former.”49 Accordingly, a tribunal in
any of these jurisdictions should favor an interpretation that the parties manifestly intended over what the contract expresses.
The main provision of the Peruvian Civil Code on this matter,
Article 1361, calls for construction from a similar standpoint: “One
should presume the terms contained in the contract to coincide with
the intent of the parties. Whoever denies such coincidence shall bear
the burden of proof.”50 In other words, judges should concentrate on
out the common intention of the parties rather than limit oneself to the literal
meaning of the words.”).
46
CD. CIV. (Braz.) (2003), art. 112 (“Nas declarações de vontade se atenderá
mais à intenção nelas consubstanciada do que ao sentido literal da linguagem.”)
(“Regarding declarations of intent, one should attend more to the intent embodied
in them than to the literal sense of the words.”). See also BGB (Germany) (1900),
Art.133 (“Bei der Auslegung einer Willenserklärung ist der wirkliche Wille zu
erforschen und nicht an dem buchstäblichen Sinne des Ausdrucks zu haften.”)
(“In interpreting a declaration of intent, one should inquire into the actual intent
rather than into the literal meaning of the words.”).
47
CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 1560 (“Conocida claramente la intención de
los contratantes, debe estarse a ella más que a lo literal de las palabras.”).
48
See CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 1618; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art.
1576; CD. CIV. (El. Salv.) (1859), art. 1431.
49
See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 1576; CD. CIV. (Mex., D.F.) (1928),
art. 1851; CD. CIV. (Nicar.) (1904), art. 2496; CD. CIV. (Pan.) (1961), art. 1132;
CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1939), art. 1233 (“Si los términos de un contrato son claros y no
dejan duda sobre la intención de los contratantes, se estará al sentido literal de sus
cláusulas. Si las palabras parecieren contrarias a la intención evidente de los contratantes, prevalecerá ésta sobre aquéllas.”).
50
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1361 (“Se presume que la declaración expresada en el contrato responde a la voluntad común de las partes y quien niegue esa
coincidencia debe probarla.”).
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the aim of the parties and treat the ultimately undersigned document
as the principal evidentiary means. Nonetheless, they should privilege the intention over the contractual text in the face of a demonstrable divergence.
Other relevant parts of Peru’s Civil Code support this reading.
Article 1356, for instance, bears the heading “Primacy of the Intent
of the Contracting Parties” and provides that: “Except when mandatory, legal rules on contracts are subject to the intent of the parties.”51 Likewise, Articles 1362 and 1352 establish, respectively,
that: “Contracts shall be negotiated, executed, and complied with, in
accordance with good faith and the common intent of the parties”52
and generally “come about simply through the consent of the parties . . . .”53
Consequently, courts throughout Latin America, including Peru,
must construe a contract to entail A if they find that the parties expected this entailment. They must do so whether the text states A or
B and, naturally, when it permits either construction. Coincidentally,
the legal order in these countries does not impose any special restrictions, such as the common law “parol evidence rule,”54 on the
submission of proof in the inquiry into the aim of the parties.
A Paraguayan and a Chilean adjudicator, for example, would
each refer to A, in turn, as (1) the “common intention of the parties”
into which one should inquire “rather than limit oneself to the literal
sense of the words” and (2) the clear “intention of the contracting
parties” that carries “more weight than the contract’s literal words.”
Analogously, a Peruvian litigant who proves A to be “the intent of
51

CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1356 (“Primacía de la voluntad de contratantes”; “Las disposiciones de la ley sobre contratos son supletorias de la voluntad
de las partes, salvo que sean imperativas.”).
52
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1362 (“Los contratos deben negociarse, celebrarse y ejecutarse según las reglas de la buena fe y común intención de las partes.”).
53
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1352 (“Los contratos se perfeccionan por el
consentimiento de las partes . . . .”).
54
See Arthur Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 603 (1944)
(“When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that
contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and
negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the
writing.”).
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the parties” overcomes any presumption in favor of “the terms contained in the contract.” He or she may thereby reinforce the document in writing if convergent, clarify it if ambiguous, or trump it if
divergent.
In sum, Latin American law, as part of its civil law heritage,
usually requires reading a contract on the basis of the parties’ joint
intention. It commands enforcing the latter, when plainly ascertainable, even if at odds with the eventually executed instrument. Along
parallel lines, Peru’s Civil Code necessitates disregarding the contractual wording upon proof of a contrary intent. Throughout the region, one must interpret a contract to mean A if one ascertains that
the parties intended this meaning. One must do so whether the text
says A or B and, of course, when it allows either interpretation.
C.

Third-Party Contracts
In consequence, the judiciary in Latin America, as in the civil
law tradition as a whole, should normally base itself on the intent of
the parties in order to decide whom the contract benefits or entitles
and how or to what exactly. It should first turn to the text for guidance, but may have to look beyond to discover what precisely the
parties intended. If they meant to confer a benefit or a right to another person in a certain manner, they should have their way, independently of whether the ensuing document affirms so or not. Latin
American legal systems do not exempt such agreements from the
core precepts of contractual interpretation, let alone advance alternative exegetical fundaments.
The so-called principle of “contractual relativity,”55 which often
prevails in the civil law world and which establishes that “contracts
only obligate and bind the parties,”56 should not alter the analysis. It
merely constitutes a default norm with numerous exceptions.57 In
55

See, e.g., PILAR JIMÉNEZ BLANCO, EL CONTRATO INTERNACIONAL A FAVOR
33 (Imprenta Universitaria: Santiago de Compostela, Spain) (2002)
(“relatividad contractual”).
56
Id. (“los contratos sólo obligan y vinculan a las partes del mismo”).
57
See Aníbal Torres Vásquez, Contrato en favor de tercero, at 14 (originally
published as ANÍBAL TORRES VÁSQUEZ, Ch. IX (Contrato en favor de tercero),
Vol. II, TEORÍA GENERAL DEL CONTRATO (Instituto Pacífico: Lima) (2012)) (available at http://www.etorresvasquez.com.pe/pdf/CONTRATO-EN-FAVOR-DETERCER.pdf) (last visited on 9/18/2016) (“Sin embargo, el principio de la relatividad del contrato no es absoluto, porque el ordenamiento jurídico permite que el
DE TERCERO

102

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

fact, many of the very laws that espouse the concept also unequivocally legitimate third party accords.
For instance, Argentina’s 2016 Civil Code embraces, in its Article 1021, this “General Rule”: “A contract generates effects only
among the contracting parties; not with respect to third parties, except as provided by law.”58 To avoid any misunderstanding, it adds
the following, in its Article 1022, on “Third Parties”: “A contract
does not give rise to obligations on the part of third parties. Moreover, third parties have no right to invoke it to impose obligations not
agreed upon on the contracting parties, except as provided by law.”59
Nonetheless, the same piece of legislation subsequently sanctions an “agreement in favor of a third party,” under its Article 1027,
in these terms: “If a contract contains an agreement in favor of a
third party . . . , the promisor thereby grants that person the corresponding rights or benefits as agreed with the promisee . . . .With
his acceptance, the third party acquires the rights and privileges resulting from the agreement in his favor.”60 Hence, the Argentine
Civil Code does not defer the specification of exceptional cases to
other enactments, but, rather, starts undertaking the task itself.

contrato pueda producir sus efectos favorables en cabeza de un tercero; así sucede
cuando uno de los contratantes tiene interés en obtener que la otra parte ejecute
su prestación ante un tercero beneficiario, atribuyéndole a este último el derecho
de exigirla.”) (“Nonetheless, the principle of contractual relativity is not absolute.
The law allows a contract to produce effects favorable to a third party. For instance, one of the contracting parties may have an interest in his counterparty performing an action for the benefit of a third party beneficiary. He thus grants the
latter the right to enforce the agreement”). See also id. at 55.
58
CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 1021 (“Regla general: El contrato sólo tiene
efecto entre las partes contratantes; no lo tiene con respecto a terceros, excepto en
los casos previstos por la ley.”).
59
Id. art. 1022 (“Situación de los terceros: El contrato no hace surgir obligaciones a cargo de terceros, ni los terceros tienen derecho a invocarlo para hacer
recaer sobre las partes obligaciones que éstas no han convenido, excepto disposición legal.”).
60
Id. art. 1027 (“Estipulación a favor de tercero: Si el contrato contiene una
estipulación a favor de un tercero beneficiario, determinado o determinable, el
promitente le confiere los derechos o facultades resultantes de lo que ha convenido con el estipulante . . . .El tercero aceptante obtiene directamente los derechos
y las facultades resultantes de la estipulación a su favor.”).
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The civil codes of Bolivia,61 Nicaragua,62 Panama,63 Paraguay,64
Puerto Rico,65 and Venezuela,66 as well as France,67 embrace essentially the same approach. So does their Peruvian counterpart. The

61
See CD. CIV. (Bol.) (1976), art. 519 (“El contrato tiene fuerza de ley entre
las partes contratantes. No puede ser disuelto sino por consentimiento muto o por
las causas autorizadas por la ley.”) (“A contract has the force of law among the
contracting parties. It may not be dissolved except by mutual consent or as authorized by law.”); art. 526 (“Es válida la estipulación en favor de un tercero,
cuando el estipulante, actuando en nombre propio, tiene un interés lícito en hacerla.”) (“An agreement in favor of a third party is valid when the promisee, acting
in his own name, has a legitimate interest in entering into it.”).
62
See CD. CIV. (Nicar.) (1904), art. 1836 (“Las obligaciones que nacen de los
contratos, tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes contratantes, y deben cumplirse al
tenor de los mismos.”) (“The obligations arising from a contract have the force of
law among the contracting parties and shall be complied with in accordance with
the contractual text.”); art. 1875 (“Si en la obligación se hubiere estipulado alguna
ventaja a favor de un tercero, éste podrá exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación,
si la hubiere aceptado y hécholo saber al obligado antes de ser revocada.”) (“If an
obligation contains an agreement to benefit a third party, the latter may enforce
the obligation if he has accepted it and informed the obligated party prior to its
revocation.”).
63
See CD. CIV. (Pan.) (1961), art. 976 (“Las obligaciones que nacen de los
contratos tienen fuerza de ley
entre las partes contratantes, y deben cumplirse al tenor de los mismos.”) (“The
obligations arising from a contract have the force of law among the contracting
parties and shall be complied with in accordance with the contractual text.”); art.
1108 (“Si el contrato contuviere alguna estipulación en favor de un tercero, éste
podrá exigir su cumplimiento, siempre que hubiese hecho saber su aceptación al
obligado antes de que haya sido aquella revocada.”) (“If the contract contains an
agreement in favor of a third party, the latter may enforce the former as long as
he informs the obligated party that he has accepted it prior to its revocation.”).
64
See CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 717 (“Los contratos no pueden oponerse a
terceros ni ser invocados por ellos, salvo los casos previstos en la ley.”) (“Contracts do not bind and may not be invoked by third parties, except as provided by
law.”); art. 732 (“El que obrando en su propio nombre estipule una obligación a
favor de un tercero, tiene el derecho de exigir su ejecución en provecho de ese
tercero.”) (“Whoever, acting in his own name, agrees to an obligation in favor of
a third party has the right to enforce it.”).
65
See CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1939), art. 1209 (“Los contratos sólo producen efecto
entre las partes que los otorgan y sus herederos . . . .Si el contrato contuviere alguna estipulación en favor de un tercero, éste podrá exigir su cumplimiento, siempre que hubiese hecho saber su aceptación al obligado antes de que haya sido
aquélla revocada.”) (“Contracts produce effects only among the contracting parties and their heirs . . . . If the contract contains an agreement in favor of a third
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latter embeds in its section on “Contracts in General,” among its
“General Provisions,” Article 1363: “Contracts produce effects only
among the parties that executed them . . . .”68 Of course, it does not
thus preclude the enforcement of a contract legitimately intended to
deviate from the standard enunciated. After all, Article 1353 already
declares the whole “section’s general rules” inoperative if “incompatible with the specific rules applicable to” the contract in question.69 Indeed, Aníbal Torres Vásquez explains that the “rule articulated [in Article 1363] allows many exceptions, in which the con-

party, the latter may enforce the former as long as he informs the obligated party
that he has accepted it prior to its revocation.”).
66
See CD. CIV. (Venez.) (1982), art. 1166 (“Los contratos no tienen efecto
sino entre las partes contratantes: no dañan ni aprovechan a los terceros, excepto
en los casos establecidos por la Ley.”) (“Contracts produce no effects except
among the contracting parties. They may neither burden nor benefit third parties,
except as provided by law.”); art. 1164 (“Se puede estipular en nombre propio en
provecho de un tercero cuando se tiene un interés personal, material o moral, en
el cumplimiento de la obligación . . . .Salvo convención en contrario, por efecto
de la estipulación el tercero adquiere un derecho contra el promitente.”) (“One
may enter into an agreement in one’s own name for the benefit of a third party
based on one’s own personal, material, or moral interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation. . . . .Unless otherwise stipulated, the third party acquires a right
against the promisor by virtue of the agreement.”).
67
See CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 1165 (“Les conventions n’ont d’effet
qu’entre les parties contractantes; elles ne nuisent point au tiers, et elles ne lui
profitent que dans le cas prévu par l’article 1121.”) (“Contracts have no effect
except among the contracting parties. They may not burden a third party; nor benefit him except as provided under Article 1121.); art. 1121 (“On peut pareillement
stipuler au profit d’un tiers lorsque telle est la condition d’une stipulation que l’on
fait pour soi-même ou d’une donation que l’on fait à un autre.”) (“Similarly, one
may contract in favor of a third party, as in a condition to an agreement that one
undertakes for oneself or as in a donation that one makes for someone else.”).
68
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1363 (“Los contratos sólo producen efectos
entre las partes que los otorgan . . . .”).
69
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1353 (“Todos los contratos de derecho privado . . . quedan sometidos a las reglas generales contenidas en esta sección, salvo
en cuanto resulten incompatibles con las reglas particulares de cada contrato.”)
(“Every private law contract is subject to this section’s general rules, except if
they are incompatible with the specific rules applicable to it.”).
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tract may produce effects favorable or unfavorable to third parties.”70 He mentions, as one example among many, “liability insurance policies for harm caused by automobile drivers, physicians,
etc., establishing that the insurance company will indemnify any
victims (third parties to the insurance contract).”71
More broadly, two parties may, under the express authorization
of Article 1457, enter into a “contract for the benefit of a third
party,” with one of them committing before the other one “to do
something for the benefit of a third party.”72 Article 1458, in turn,
echoes the law in Argentina,73 Nicaragua,74 and Paraguay,75 when it
proclaims that: “The right of the third party arises directly and immediately upon the execution of the contract.” 76 Furthermore, the
same provision stresses that the third party renders “the right . . . enforceable” by telling the parties at any moment that he intends “to

70

Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 2 (“esta regla presenta muchas excepciones por las que el contrato puede producir efectos favorables o desfavorables
para terceros.”).
71
Id. at 34 (“Los seguros de responsabilidad civil por daños causados por
conductores de vehículos, médicos, etc., que establecen que la compañía aseguradora debe indemnizar a las víctimas (terceros ajenos al contrato de seguro).”)
72
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1457 (“Por el contrato en favor de tercero, el
promitente se obliga frente al estipulante a cumplir una prestación en beneficio de
tercera persona.”). Aníbal Torres Vásquez lists “[t]he contract in favor of a third
party” as an exception to the relativity principle. (“El contrato celebrado en favor
de tercero.”) Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 11.
73
See CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 1027 (quoted supra, note 60).
74
See CD. CIV. (Nicar.) (1904), art. 2492 (“Después de la aceptación del tercero, el prometiente está obligado directamente para con él, a ejecutar su promesa,
y el derecho del tercero queda asegurado con las mismas garantías que el estipulante pactó.”) (“With his acceptance, the third party imposes a direct obligation to
keep the promise in his favor on the promisor. He thereby secures the same guaranties as agreed with the promisee.”)
75
See CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 730 (“ . . . las relaciones entre el estipulante y el tercero serán juzgadas como si el contrato se hubiere ajustado directamente entre ellos.”) (“ . . . The relationship between the promisee and the third
party will be adjudicated as if the two had directly entered the contract with each
other.”).
76
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1458 (“El derecho del tercero surge directa e
inmediatamente de la celebración del contrato.”). See Torres Vásquez, supra note
57, at 16 (“El Derecho del tercero surge directamente del contrato, sin necesidad
que preste su aceptación.”) (“The third party’s right derives directly from the contract, independently of his acceptance.”). See also id. at 46, 50, 50-51, 60.
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exercise that right.”77 Finally, Article 1461, captioned “Enforceability of the Promisor’s Compliance,” reiterates that “the right to demand the promisor’s compliance with the obligation . . . belongs to
the third party beneficiary once he has made the declaration referred
to in Article 1458 . . . .”78 “Since the law does not specify the matter,” Torres Vásquez elucidates, “the acceptance of the benefit may
take place either expressly or tacitly . . . .”79
Significantly, Article 1354, which equally appears in the section
on “Contracts in General” as one of the “General Provisions,” announces that: “The parties may freely determine the contract’s content, so long as it does not run counter to a mandatory legal norm.”80
Explicitly denominated a “contract” in its codified definition,81 a

77

CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1458 (“Empero, será necesario que el tercero
haga conocer al estipulante y al promitente su voluntad de hacer uso de ese derecho, para que sea exigible, operando esta declaración retroactivamente.”). See Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 43 (“Una vez que el tercero hace conocer al estipulante y al promitente su voluntad de hacer uso del derecho establecido en su
favor (art. 1458), tiene a su disposición todos los medios compulsivos que corresponden al acreedor contra el deudor (art. 1219).”) (“Once the third party informs
the promisee and the promissor that he intends to exercise the right established in
his favor (art. 1458), he has at his disposal all of the creditor’s means of coercion
against the debtor (art. 1219).”); id. at 16 (“Pero para que este derecho sea exigible, sí es necesario que [el tercero] haga conocer a los contratantes su aceptación
de aprovechar la estipulación en su favor.”) (“Nonetheless, the enforceability of
the right necessitates that [the third party] inform the contracting parties of his
acceptance of the agreement in his favor.”) . See also id. at 49, 50, 55.
78
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1461 (“Exigibilidad de cumplimiento al promitente: El . . . derecho a exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación por el promitente . . . corresponde al tercero beneficiario una vez que haya efectuado la declaración a que se refiere el artículo 1458 . . . .”).
79
Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 44-45 (“Al no existir forma preestablecida por la ley, la aceptación del beneficio puede hacerse en forma expresa o tácita
(art. 141) . . . .”).
80
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), 1354 (“Las partes pueden determinar libremente el
contenido del contrato, siempre que no sea contrario a norma legal de carácter
imperativo.”).
81
See CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1457 (“contrato”). See also Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 36 (“Es un contrato. Con la figura del contrato a favor de
tercero se hace referencia al tipo de contrato con el cual se crea un beneficio o
favor económico para terceros.”) (It is a contract. Third party contracts produce
an economic benefit or advantage for a third party.”).
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third party agreement falls squarely under Article 1354,82 as well as
under the previously analyzed precepts on contractual exegesis.
Therefore, individuals may set up such a scheme and structure it, to
a large extent, as they wish.
By the same token, the parties do not have to rely on a particular
formulation, much less inscribe the instrument with the phrase “third
party contract.” They solely have to intend to grant the third party
the entitlement or the advantage at stake. Once again, an adjudicator
may discern such intent from the face of the ultimately undersigned
document or from the underlying circumstances.
In a nutshell, ordinary interpretation principles, which privilege
the parties’ intent, apply when determining whom the contract benefits or entitles and how or to what exactly. The Civil Code in Peru
and elsewhere in the civil law realm authorizes third party agreements, exempting them from the fallback principle that restricts contractual effects to the contracting parties. The third party attains his
or her right directly and immediately upon execution of the relevant
instrument and may vindicate it by notifying the parties, whether
explicitly or implicitly, at any time. Freedom of contract, as well as
the statutory sanction, empowers people both to enter into such an
arrangement and to configure it, to a considerable degree, as they
see fit.
D.

Recapitulation
First, Latin American law, as part of its civil law heritage, usually requires reading a contract on the basis of the parties’ common
intention. It commands enforcing the latter, when plainly demonstrable, even if at odds with the ultimately undersigned document.
Along parallel lines, the Peruvian legal system necessitates disregarding the contractual wording upon proof of a contrary intent.
Throughout the region, courts must interpret a contract to mean A if
they ascertain that the parties intended this meaning. They must do
82

See Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 37, 41 (“En el Derecho peruano no
hay nada que prohíba [el contrato a favor de tercero], puesto que las partes son
libres de determinar el contenido del contrato, siempre que no sea contrario a normas imperativas (art. 1354), al orden público y a las buenas costumbres.”) (“Nothing in Peruvian law prohibits third party contracts, inasmuch as the parties may
freely define the contract’s content, as long as it does not run counter to a mandatory legal norm (Art. 1354), the public order, or good morals.”).
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so whether the text says A or B and, of course, when it allows either
interpretation.
Secondly, these exegetical principles, which privilege the parties’ intent, apply when determining whom the contract benefits or
entitles and how or to what exactly. The Civil Code in Peru and elsewhere in the civil law realm authorizes third party agreements, exempting them from the default norm that restricts contractual effects
to the contracting parties. The third party acquires a right directly
and immediately upon execution of the relevant instrument and may
vindicate it by notifying the parties, whether explicitly or implicitly,
at any time. Freedom of contract, as well as the statutory sanction,
empowers people both to enter into such an arrangement and to configure it, to a considerable degree, as they see fit.
V.

RETROACTIVITY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ECUADOR AND
LATIN AMERICA

A.

For Starters
Mostly, the civil law proscribes applying enactments retroactively and awarding punitive damages. It does so somewhat differently from one country to the next. Nevertheless, these prohibitions
operate relatively uniformly throughout.
B.

Retroactive Application of Laws: Point and Counterpoint
The bar on retroactivity plays a central role in Latin American
civil law. It prohibits the retroactive application of legislation. Accordingly, courts may not rely on an enactment passed after the facts
of the complaint occurred.
The Ecuadorian Civil Code, like many others in the civil law
universe, proclaims that laws “shall have no retroactive effect.”83 It
83

See CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (1970), art. 7 (“no
tiene efecto retroactivo”). See also CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Chile)
(1857), art. 2; CD. CIV. (D.R.) (1826), art. 2; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7; CD.
CIV. (El Salv.) (1859), art. 9; CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 2; CD. CIV. (Hond.)
(1906), art. 7; CD. CIV. FED. (Mex.) (1928), art. 5; CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 2;
CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 3; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Venez.)
(1982), art. 3. Sometimes, Latin American constitutions, like their U.S. counterpart, embody the same restriction. See, e.g., CONST. (Mex) (1917), art. 14.
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thus disallows reliance on a statute in order to challenge conduct that
took place earlier. Defendants thus receive protection against having
to face liability based on norms that did not hold when they undertook the challenged actions.
Nonetheless, Rule 20(a) of Article 7 carves out a unique exception. It declares, in essence, that purely procedural legislation may
become valid immediately.84 The provision reads: “Laws that concern the substantiation and the solemnities of lawsuits shall prevail
over prior laws from the moment in which they enter into effect.”85
Article 163(2) of Ecuador’s Organic Judicial Code contains almost
identical language.86
Of course, a judge may not merely state that an enactment
amounts to procedure, rather than substance, in order to apply it. Nor
may she focus on its adjective to the exclusion of its substantive
components to the same end. If the judiciary had the authority to
label, at will, any statute as purely procedural for purposes of retroactive application, it could end up hollowing out the ban on ex post
facto laws. Tribunals must, therefore, rationally and restrictively
construe the exemption for legislation that exclusively regards procedure. They must examine the invoked enactment in its entirety
before classifying it as strictly formal and deploying it retroactively.
A complex, concrete controversy in which a complainant rests
her claim for damages on a newly enacted statute may help illustrate
the intricacies of the issue. For instance, she may file a genuinely
collective or diffuse action under an environmental law, such as Ecuador’s Environmental Management Act,87 or an equivalent enactment elsewhere in the region.88 Article 43 of the Ecuadorian statute
84

See CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7(20(a)); CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (1970), art.
7(20a).
85
Id. (“Las leyes concernientes a la sustanciación y ritualidad de los juicios,
prevalecen sobre las anteriores desde el momento en que deban comenzar a regir.”).
86
CD. ORG. JUD. (2009), art. 163(2) (“Sin embargo, las leyes concernientes a
la sustanciación y ritualidad de los juicios, prevalecen sobre las anteriores desde
el momento en que deben comenzar a regir.”).
87
L. 77, L. Gestión Ambiental (Ecuad.) (1999).
88
See, e.g., CONST. (Braz.) (1988), art. 5(LXXIII) (“[A]ny citizen or party
with standing [may] file a popular action seeking to annul . . . state action that
impinges . . . upon the environment.”) (“[Q]ualquer cidadão e parte legítima
[pode] propor ação popular que vise a anular ato lesivo . . . de entidade de que o
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provides that “persons, legal entities, [and] groups of people united
by a common interest and directly affected by the injurious action
or omission may sue . . . for damages in relation to any sanitary or
environmental harm.”89 It emphasizes that environmental rights are
“collective” and “shared by the community” and explicates “diffuse
interest[s],” somewhat confusingly, as “homogeneous and indivisible interests held by indeterminate groups of individuals tied by
common circumstances.”90
Consequently, the claimant would apparently be basing her suit
on a substantively new enactment that profoundly alters the state of
the law. When the contested conduct occurred, the legal system entitled her to seek compensation, under the Civil Code, when someone negligently or culpably injured her personally.91 Since then, it
additionally empowers her to demand reparation for any generalized
harm to the environment and to the community’s health.
Diffuse claims differ radically from their individual counterparts. The former pertain, indivisibly, to society and are independent
of any individual rights that citizens may hold. The latter belong to

Estado participe, . . . ao meio ambiente.”); L. 24 (Pan.) (1995), art. 78 (“Any person may file, under this law, an environmental public action . . . regarding not an
individual or direct injury, but rather a threat or injury to diffuse interests or to the
interests of a collectivity.”) (“En cumplimiento de la presente Ley, toda persona
podrá interponer acción pública ambiental, sin necesidad de asunto previo cuando
por su naturaleza no exista una lesión individual o directa, sino que atañe a los
intereses difusos o a los intereses de la colectividad.”); L. 28237, CD. PROCESAL
CONST. (Peru) (2004), art. 40 (“Likewise, any person may file for a writ of protection when a threat to or a violation of environmental or other diffuse rights that
have constitutional stature is at stake . . . .”) (“Asimismo, puede interponer demanda de amparo cualquier persona cuando se trate de amenaza o violación del
derecho al medio ambiente u otros derechos difusos que gocen de reconocimiento
constitucional . . . .”).
89
L. 77, L. Gestión Ambiental (Ecuad.) (1999), art. 43 (“Las personas naturales, jurídicas o grupos humanos, vinculados por un interés común y afectados
directamente por la acción u omisión dañosa podrán interponer ante el Juez competente, acciones por daños y perjuicios y por el deterioro causado a la salud o al
medio ambiente incluyendo la biodiversidad con sus elementos constitutivos.”).
90
Id., Glosario de Definiciones (“Inter[eses] Difuso[s]”) (“intereses homogéneos y de naturaleza indivisible, cuyos titulares son grupos indeterminados de individuos ligados por circunstancias comunes.”).
91
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), arts. 2214, 2229.
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particular individuals and involve matters that concern them personally, rather than the collectivity.92
For example, the community may have claims to a sound environment that transcend those of any of the members. It may, accordingly, demand redress for the contamination of a remote, uninhabited, and inaccessible territory. A citizen who represents the collectivity under these circumstances, assuming a traditionally governmental function, seeks to vindicate an entirely different kind of entitlement than when she pursues compensation for the pollution of a
piece of land that she owns.
Hence, the suitor would be hard pressed to portray, with plausibility, the transition from a regime of private entitlements to one of
diffuse entitlements as purely procedural. In light of this difficulty,
she could try a different strategy. First, she could acknowledge that
the environmental legislation does touch upon substantive matters.
Then, she could contend that, in a deeper sense, the statute simply
empowers a new class of litigants to vindicate a long-established,
formerly state-enforced entitlement and, as such, operates mostly
procedurally.
In proceeding down this path, however, the complaint starts by
conceding that the relevant provisions of the environmental law do
bear upon substance. Hence, it renders irrelevant the question
whether the statute might, from a more profound perspective, have
an adjective character. After all, the Civil Code in Ecuador denies
any retroactive effect whatsoever to substantive laws even if they
partially regulate or constitute procedure.
At the end of the day, the empowerment of citizens to exercise
the diffuse entitlements, whose vindication was formerly the state’s
prerogative, would seemingly entail, per se, a substantive change in
the law. It would not only increase the number of potential lawsuits
by a sizeable margin but also introduce a significantly different type
of plaintiff. The corresponding incentives, requirements, and restrictions differ considerably when private parties, as opposed to the
authorities, file the action. In comparison with the state, individuals
and non-governmental entities may, inter alia, find more of a moti92

See generally Ángel R. Oquendo, Justice for All: Certifying Global Class
Actions, WASHINGTON U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. (2016) (forthcoming),
IV(E)(3).
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vation in the prospect of a substantial monetary reward, need to disclose less about the suit under freedom-of-information or other principles, and confront fewer due-process limitations when interacting
with their opponent in court.
An enactment that thus accords citizens standing to enforce the
community’s diffuse rights would seem not to qualify as just ceremonial precisely because it brings about such a major alteration in
the legal order. In the terms of the Civil Code, it would not appear
simply to “concern the substantiation [or] the rituality of lawsuits.”93
Ultimately, such a law, upon retroactive deployment, tends to impose on potential defendants exactly the kind of extra burden that
the bar on retroactivity aims to spare them.
At this juncture, the complainant could attempt an alternative
tack. Instead of purporting to categorize the ex post facto statute as
procedural, she might assert that it basically boils down to a reenactment of already existing laws entitling individuals to sue. She
might first zero in on Civil-Code provisions that institute the right
to prosecute a suit in tort.
For example, Article 2214 essentially declares that whoever
harms someone else through an illicit act has an obligation to indemnify the injured party.94 Similarly, Article 2229 generally requires people to repair any damage that they cause through malice
or negligence.95 The claimant may argue that these provisions,
which obviously have equivalents throughout the civil law universe,96 contain the substantive law upon which her action rests. She
93

CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7(20a) (“la sustanciación y ritualidad de los
juicios”).
94
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2214 (“Whoever commits a criminal or negligent offense that injures someone else, bears an obligation to indemnify, without
prejudice to the legally imposed punishment for the offense.”) (“El que ha cometido un delito o cuasidelito que ha inferido daño a otro, está obligado a la indemnización; sin perjuicio de la pena que le impongan las leyes por el delito o cuasidelito.”).
95
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2229 (“As a general rule, a person shall repair any harm attributable to his or her malice or negligence.”) (“Por regla general
todo daño que pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra persona debe ser
reparado por ésta.”).
96
See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Braz.) (2003), art. 927 (“Whoever harms another by an
illicit act shall bear an obligation to repair the harm.”) (“Aquele que, por ato
ilícito, causar dano a outrem, fica obrigado a repará-lo.”); CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857),
art. 2329 (“As a general rule, a person shall repair any harm attributable to his or
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may maintain that they may serve to address diffuse injuries to the
society as a whole.
Nevertheless, this interpretation entails problematic consequences. Articles 2214 and 2229 posit ordinary tort actions through
which plaintiffs vindicate their own individual entitlements, rather
than the community’s diffuse rights. The judiciary would be transforming these provisions if it read an unprecedented diffuse-rights
suit into them. In so doing, it would be acting against cardinal civil
law tenets, which command strict adherence to the letter of the
Code,97 as well as expressly condemn the retroactive application of
laws.98
At this point, the suitor might turn her attention to Article 2236
of the Civil Code.99 She might note that this provision entitles any
person to file a popular action in order to remove a contingent harm,
even if the drafters had probably not anticipated the possibility of
application to the case at hand. She may insist that legal institutions
require updating and evolution and conclude that this popular action
lies in environmental cases.
Indeed, the Ecuadorian Civil Code, like many of its counterparts
in the region, establishes a series of such private-law popular actions
for the enforcement of diffuse rights under specific circumstances.100 Specifically, Article 2236, like its equivalents elsewhere,
authorizes “a popular action in cases in which, because of someone’s imprudence or negligence, a contingent harm threatens an indeterminate number of people.”101 It requires a precisely identified
her malice or negligence.”) (“Por regla general todo daño que pueda imputarse a
malicia o negligencia de otra persona, debe ser reparado por ésta.”); CD. CIV. (Fr.)
(1804), art. 1382 (“Whoever culpably harms another shall bear an obligation to
repair the harm.”) (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer. “); CD. CIV. (P.R.)
(1930), art. 1802 (“Whoever harms another by a culpable or negligent act or omission shall bear an obligation to repair the harm.”) (“El que por acción u omisión
causa daño a otro, interviniendo culpa o negligencia, está obligado a reparar el
daño causado.”).
97
See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18.
98
Id. art. 7.
99
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2236. See infra note 101 and accompanying
text.
100
See Oquendo, supra note 92, IV(E)(3).
101
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2236 (“Por regla general se concede acción
popular en todos los casos de daño contingente que por imprudencia o negligencia
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contingent harm,102 in addition to contemplating only injunctive
remedies for the purpose of removing the danger at stake.103
The hypothesized complaint would presumably fail to meet
these requirements. In particular, it does not allege the right kind of
injury or pray for the right type of relief. As a result, the provision
at stake would evidently not apply to the dispute at hand.
Once again, one must appreciate the difficulty of reading a new
and open-ended diffuse-rights action into Article 2236. This construction, like that of Articles 2214 and 2229 previously analyzed,
would expand the scope of the provision at issue beyond recognition
and run up against the civil law tradition’s interdiction of any judicial deviation from precisely codified language and of retroactive
application of laws. Furthermore, it would tend to render the other
Civil-Code popular actions superfluous and ultimately to undercut
the codifiers’ overall approach, which consists in setting up a series
of tightly tailored diffuse actions, rather than a single far-reaching
suit.
At each turn, the adjudicator might feel tempted to play loose
with the standard. She might have to remind herself that the latter
de alguno amenace a personas indeterminadas.”). See also CD. CIV. (Chile)
(1857), art. 2333; CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 2359; CD. CIV. (El Salv.) (1859),
art. 2084.
102
These actions have a preventive character. See, generally, José Luis Diez
Schwerter & Verónica Pía Delgado Schneider, Algunas útiles herramientas olvidadas en nuestra práctica del “derecho de daños,” 214 REV. DCHO. UNIV.
CONCEPCIÓN 143, 144-148 (§ 2) (2003) (“Popular Preventive Actions”); Francisco de la Barra Gili, Responsabilidad extracontractual por daño ambiental: El
problema de la legitimación activa, 29 REV. CHILENA DCHO. 367, 401-402
(§ 2.5.3) (2002) (“inhibitory mechanism”; “purpose of preventing a contingent
harm”); ARTURO ALESSANDRI, DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACONTRACTUAL EN
EL DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO 218 (III(3)) (1983). As such, they target the party who
is in charge and, consequently, in a position to prevent the contingent harm. Someone who has no control cannot possibly avert that harm and therefore is not subject
to suit.
103
The Article has “the purpose of preventing a contingent harm” and entitles
plaintiffs “to appear before a judge so that he can issue an order to forestall [the
contingent harm].” Barra Gili, supra note 102, at 401 (§ 2.5.3) (“para ocurrir ante
el juez a fin de que ordene hacerlo desaparecer”); ALESSANDRI, supra note 102,
at 218 (III(3)). “A possible or hypothetical harm, based on suppositions or conjectures, . . . does not give rise to a right to indemnification.” Id. at 218 (III(3))
(“Un daño eventual, hipotético, fundado en suposiciones o conjeturas, . . . no da
derecho a indemnización.”).
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embodies a key civic guaranty, which calls for rigorous implementation. Therefore, a tribunal should err on the side of preserving the
proscription.
In sum, Ecuador, as well as other nations in the civil law world,
embraces a broad prohibition on retroactivity. It specifically exempts adjective statutes. Nevertheless, judges normally should construe this exemption narrowly in order to avoid undermining the ban
or the underlying principles.
C.

Keeping Civil Punishment in Check
All in all, punitive damages have no basis in Latin American or
in Continental European law. Ecuador’s legal system, like its counterparts in the civil law tradition, does not provide for such a remedy.
Of course, scholars such as Argentine Ramón Daniel Pizarro propose opening up to punitive damages under limited circumstances.104 Still, Pizarro himself typically recognizes the unavailability of this type of relief in Latin America and Continental Europe.105 In addition, an adjudicator could probably not justify the
imposition of punitive damages as an application of a principle of
universal law. Finally, she would likely not be able legitimately to
reinterpret such an award as involving moral damages because it
would satisfy none of the requirements for that kind of compensation.
Civil law courts ordinarily may not grant punitive damages. In
order to disregard this ban on their own, they would have to set aside
profoundly ingrained principles, such as those that establish that
codified law strictly binds the judiciary. In fact, this restriction retarded the transition from pecuniary to so-called moral or psychological damages. For a very long time, judges granted compensation
for material and economic injuries, but not for pain and suffering.
They felt that awarding the latter kind of redress, as opposed to the
former, lacked support in the Civil Code and would enable them to
exercise unbound and impermissible discretion. In some countries,

104
105

See infra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
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this attitude changed only upon almost unanimous scholarly condemnation and upon an amendment to the Code, the Constitution, or
both.106
In order to award punitive damages in Latin America or in Continental Europe, a tribunal would also have to disregard the equally
deep-seated conviction that a civil remedy may not operate as punishment. Actually, this widespread persuasion has hindered the development of any significant support, either among scholars or
among lawmakers, for the adoption of this kind of reparation. In exceptional cases, Latin American and Continental European jurisdictions sanction not punitive damages generally, but rather relief that
transcends compensation and that appears to have a punitive component. The legal systems that take this approach do so, occasionally, in areas like consumer-protection.107 In the relevant cases, they
usually authorize the adjudicator to make the award under limited
circumstances and under specific guidelines. She may not generally
pass on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and assess a
commensurate penalty, as with punitive damages in the United
States.
Some civil law tribunals, like the German Supreme Court, have
even gone so far as to declare punitive damages inconsistent with
the public order and to decline to execute foreign judgments that
include such a remedy.108 The 2005 Hague Convention on Choiceof-Court Agreements unambiguously authorizes such refusal:
“Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused, if, and
to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual

106

See, generally, Miguel Reale, Moral Damages in Brazilian Law, in A
PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 121 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith Rosenn eds., 1992).
107
See, e.g., L. 24.240 (Consumer Defense Act) (Arg.) (1993), art. 52bis
(“The judge may impose, at the request and in favor of the consumer, a civil fine,
which will vary depending on the gravity of . . . the case, on providers who fail to
meet their legal or contractual duties toward consumers . . . .The civil fine may
not exceed” five (5) million pesos.).
108
See, e.g., BGHZ 118, 312 (343 f.) (Supr. Ct.) (Germany) (1992) (summarized in Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in Germany: The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 729, 730-31 (1992)).
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loss or harm suffered.”109 Similarly, the European Union Regulation
864/2007, on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations,
allows member states to decline to apply statutes from other European-Union countries on the basis of “considerations of public interest,” specifically when the law in question calls on the judiciary
to “award . . . non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages of
an excessive nature.”110
Nonetheless, commentators like Ramón Daniel Pizarro have endorsed the incorporation of a punitive component in civil indemnification under limited circumstances.111 Significantly, this author
actually acknowledges the traditional stance and cautions that “punitive damages have not attained much recognition in the Continental European system or in Latin America.”112 He specifically notes
that the punishment of “intentional torts” or of “gross negligence”
faces “serious difficulties,” mostly due to “the lack of norms for the
imposition of civil sanctions in such cases.”113
Aiming to transcend a mere “description of the system,”114 however, Pizarro advocates the “future” 115 adoption, in Argentina, of
109

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294, art. 11(1).
110
Council Regulation 864/2007 (On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations) (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L. 199/40) (EC), Consideration 32.
111
RAMÓN DANIEL PIZARRO, DERECHO DE DAÑOS 287-337 (Ch. XIII (“Daños
Punitivos”)) (1996).
112
Id. at 295 (“Los daños punitivos no han alcanzado mayor repercusión dentro el sistema de Europa Continental ni en Latinoamérica.”). Elsewhere, Pizarro
states that, “among us [in Argentina], as well as in most countries in Continental
Europe and Latin America, [punitive damages] have not attained much recognition.” Id. at 287. He notes, in particular, that civil-law literature has attributed
“little importance . . . to the punitive dimension of tort law.” Id. at 289.
113
Id. at 290 (“agravie intencionado”; “de una grosera negligencia”; “serias
dificultades”; “la ausencia de normas que permiten sanciones civiles en tales supuestos). See also id. at 291 (“The problems relating to the punishment of certain
torts” stem from “a glaring lack of adequate normative principles”) & 297 (“In
Latin America . . . , punitive damages find few antecedents.”).
114
Id. at 288 (“descripción del sistema”).
115
Id. at 287 (“futura”). See also id. at 291 & 336. Pizarro asserts that “punitive damages in the common law constitute one of the possible parameters for
consideration in the formulation of future legislation.” Id. at 291. Nonetheless, he
acknowledges that comparative efforts in the civil-law tradition usually restrict
themselves “to Continental European law and to the Latin American system” and
rarely focus on “the common law and its institutions.” Id. at 288.
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this institution, as a “useful instrument,”116 under “exceptional and
restricted” 117 circumstances. Not surprisingly, he addresses his proposal to lawmakers and insists that it requires express legislation
prior to application. He underscores, using his own italics, “the absolute necessity of providing for such penalties by law.”118 “Punishment,” he explains, “must be expressly established in the law in order to forestall an encroachment upon basic notions of legal certainty that the Constitution consecrates.”119 At the end of the day,
Pizarro is simply endorsing the kind of punitive relief that has already emerged in the civil law realm, not the wider-ranging variant
that prevails in the United States.
Of course, the Ecuadorian Civil Code’s Article 18(7a) establishes that, in the absence of a legal norm applicable to the controversy at hand or to analogous cases, an adjudicator may turn to “the
principles of universal law.”120 It thus echoes its counterparts all
over Latin America and Continental Europe.121 All the same, this
provision does not entitle judges to apply any imaginable rule to settle the disputes before them. Instead, it creates a narrow exception,
which should not undermine the judiciary’s overriding obligation to
adjudicate, strictly, according to what the Code spells out and explicitly commands.
Consequently, a tribunal must, in applying Article 18(7a) or its
equivalents throughout the civil law universe, first show that no legal norm exists for the case or for any similar controversy. Since the
Civil Code governs civil lawsuits, it does not leave a vacuum of this
116
117
118

Id. at 287.
Id. at 336 (“excepcional”; “restrictiva”).
Id. at 336 (“la necesidad indispensable de consagrar tales puniciones por

ley.”).
119

Id. at 290 (“las penas deben estar expresamente provistas por la ley, so
riesgo do afectar elementales principios de seguridad jurídica que consagra la
Constitución nacional.”)
120
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18(7a) (“A falta de ley, se aplicarán las que
existan sobre casos análogos; y no habiéndolas, se ocurrirá a los principios del
derecho universal.”).
121
See CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 2; CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857, art. 24; CD. CIV.
(Colom.) (1873), art. 32; CD. CIV. (C.R.) (1886), art. 11; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005),
art. 18(6a & 7a); CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 20; CD. CIV. FED. (Mex.) (1928),
arts. 18 & 19; CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 6; CD. CIV. (Peru) (1930), art. VIII;
CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), art. 16; CD. CIV. (Venez.)
(1982), art. 4.
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sort. In fact, it covers all kinds of tort claims, including those pertaining to injuries alleged to have occurred due to “serious culpability, serious negligence, extreme culpability,” or even due to “malice
(dolo), which consists in the positive intention to visit harm upon
someone else or upon his or her property.”122
In addition, the Code provides for a wide array of remedies, such
as indemnification,123 reparation,124 and even moral compensation.125 In a typical fashion, it does not authorize punitive damages
under any circumstances. In any event, inasmuch as courts have at
their disposal positive law to address questions of liability and relief,
Article 18(7a) does not apply.
Even in the absence of relevant legal parameters, a judge seeking
to rely on Article 18(7a) must, additionally, point to a pertinent principle of universal law. As just noted, Latin American and Continental European systems universally reject the notion that the judiciary
may punish defendants in controversies under the Civil Code. In
fact, the remedy in question appears to find clear support only in the
United States and in a few other common-law jurisdictions.126
Therefore, no principle with the necessary degree of universality
would sustain an award of punitive damages. If anything, the general
122

CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 29 (“Culpa grave, negligencia grave, culpa
lata”) (“El dolo consiste en la intención positiva de irrogar injuria a la persona o
propiedad de otro.”).
123
Id. arts. 2214-2216.
124
Id. art. 2229.
125
Id. arts. 2231-2234.
126
The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutional validity of punitive damages, while imposing strict due-process limitations. See, e.g., Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Cf. Honda
Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 SCR 362 (Sup. Ct.) (Canada) (“Punitive damages are restricted to advertent wrongful acts that are so malicious and
outrageous that they are deserving of punishment on their own . . . .Courts should
only resort to punitive damages in exceptional cases . . . .); Rookes v. Barnard,
1964 A.C. 1129, 1225-28 (H.L.) (England) (1964) (L. Devlin) (An award of “punitive or exemplary damages” may lie (1) when “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government” has taken place; (2) when
“the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself
which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff”; or (3) when
“exemplary damages are expressly [authorized] by statute.”).
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practice throughout the world points in the opposite direction,
namely, in that of a proscription of this kind of relief.
Finally, one may not persuasively assimilate punitive to moral
damages. The latter, as previously pointed out, address mainly psychological and reputational injuries and, as opposed to the former,
do not aim at punishment, but rather at compensation. They require
that the plaintiff specifically request for such relief,127 as well as that
the adjudicator assess and justify the sum awarded.128 A condemnation of a defendant to pay a penalty on grounds of allegedly reprehensible conduct would not seem to qualify as an award of moral
damages.
D.

Wrap-Up
The civil law of Ecuador, like that of other countries in Latin
America and Central Europe, forbids the retroactive application of
laws and the imposition of punitive damages. These prohibitions
play an important role in the legal system and call for strict adherence. In this area, the civil law tradition evinces an impressive
amount of congruence despite the variance in the details.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Parts II and III meditated upon, respectively, the notion of the
civil law tradition and that of codification. Thereafter, Part IV investigated the mostly common take on contractual interpretation and on
third-party agreements. Finally, Part V scrutinized the characteristic
proscriptions against retroactivity and punitive damages.
All in all, this article has reflected upon certain institutions, as
well as ideas, that inhabit the civil law universe. It has shown how
they have survived and developed in Latin America. In fact, this legal realm as a whole reveals its true internationalized and modernized face as it goes through this story of survival, development, and
even transformation. It possesses no common essence and shows itself as one simply by virtue of a family resemblance among the systems belonging to it. Hence, each one of the latter shares with the

127
128

See CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2233.
See id. art. 279.
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rest not a single element, but rather a number thereof, discontinuously and incompletely: in other words, an overarching, variegated
and somewhat nebulous history and culture.

